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SEVENTH CIRCUIT AND WISCONSIN 
SPORTS LAW JURISPRUDENCE 
MATTHEW J. MITTEN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This article identifies, synthesizes, and explains the significant contribu-
tions that the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and Wis-
consin federal and state courts have made to the rapidly developing body of 
American sports law jurisprudence.  It focuses on legal regulation of high 
school, college, Olympic, and professional sports as well as sports-related intel-
lectual property and tort issues.1  A threshold issue is what constitutes a “sport” 
from the perspective of participants and spectators, an important determination 
for purposes of the evolving judicial common law regulation and interpretation 
of statutory authorities.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court broadly defined “sport” 
as “‘[a]n activity involving physical exertion and skill that is governed by a set 
of rules or customs,” which encompasses high school cheerleading.2  Consistent 
                                                          
*Professor of Law and Director, National Sports Law Institute and LL.M. in Sports Law Program 
for Foreign Lawyers.  I acknowledge and appreciate the excellent research assistance and initial drafting 
of the Torts Issues section of this article by Ethan Sebert, Marquette University Law School Class of 
2015.  
1 Other interesting Seventh Circuit and Wisconsin sports-related cases involve a wide array of areas 
of law such as tax law, see Selig v. United States, 740 F.2d 572, 573–74 (7th Cir. 1984) (After becoming 
part owner of the Milwaukee Brewers, Bud Selig properly allocated $10.2 million of the $10.8 million 
purchase price of the Seattle Pilots to the value of the 149 players’ contracts acquired as part of purchase 
of club.); NFL player contract interpretation, see Tollefson v. Green Bay Packers, Inc., 41 N.W.2d 
201, 202–03 (Wis. 1950) (under terms of contract player was to receive a minimum of $3,600 regardless 
of whether or not he participated in games played where he was not discharged for cause); Johnson v. 
Green Bay Packers, Inc., 74 N.W.2d 784, 790–91 (Wis. 1956) (contract provision referring all matters 
in dispute to arbitration inapplicable to player’s claim against the club for failing to pay him); sports 
gambling, see United States v. Tedder, 403 F.3d 836, 838 (7th Cir. 2005) (defendant convicted of con-
spiring to defraud the United States by assisting a sports wagering enterprise and money laundering); 
and federal constitutional law, see Weinberg v. City of Chicago, 310 F.3d 1029, 1033–34, 1040, 1045–
46 (7th Cir. 2002) (Chicago ordinance prohibiting peddling of books within 1,000 feet of sports stadium 
impermissibly infringes free speech rights of peddler desiring to sell a book critical of sports club owner 
whose team plays in stadium). 
2 Noffke v. Bakke, 2009 WI 10, ¶ 17, 315 Wis.2d 350, 364–65, 760 N.W.2d 156, 162 (Wis. 2009) 
(quoting AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1742 (3d ed. 1992)) (construing 
Wisconsin co-participant tort immunity statute).  But see Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 
105 (2d Cir. 2012) (cheerleading is not a sport for purposes of athletic participation opportunities under 
Title IX).  
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with other jurisdictions, the Seventh Circuit ruled that a spectator is entitled only 
to “‘view whatever event transpire[s]’”3 and has no right to a sports event that 
is “exciting” or during which participants “competed well.”4 
II.  HIGH SCHOOL SPORTS 
The Seventh Circuit and Wisconsin courts have developed a significant 
body of high school sports law jurisprudence, most of which is consistent with 
other jurisdictions.  There are, however, some important, unresolved issues, as 
well as a few leading cases that, over time, may influence the development of 
the law governing high school athletics in states outside the Seventh Circuit.   
To date, there has been no judicial determination whether the respective 
governing bodies for high school sports in Illinois, Indiana, or Wisconsin are a 
state actor,5 whose rules, decisions, and conduct is subject to the constraints of 
the U.S. Constitution pursuant to Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary 
School Athletic Ass’n.6  In Brentwood Academy, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that the “nominally private character of the [Tennessee Secondary School Ath-
letic] Association [(TSSAA)] is overborne by the pervasive entwinement of 
public institutions and public officials in its composition and workings.”7  The 
Court concluded the TSSAA is a state actor because the requisite entwinement 
with the State of Tennessee exists.8  Although the state did not create the TSSAA 
or fund its operations,9 public schools constituted 84% of its membership, state 
board of education members served ex officio on its board of control and legis-
lative council, and its ministerial employees are eligible to participate in the 
state retirement system.10  The state board of education also permitted students 
to satisfy its physical education requirement by participating in athletics spon-
sored by the TSSAA.11   
Prior to the 2001 Brentwood Academy ruling, the Seventh Circuit held that 
                                                          
3 Bowers v. Fed’n Internationale de L’Automobile, 489 F.3d 316, 321–22 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Castillo v. Tyson, 701 N.Y.S.2d 423, 423 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (six-car competition does not deprive 
plaintiffs of contractual right to see a Formula One race). 
4 Id. at 322. 
5 In Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n v. Gannett Co., the parties stipulated the WIAA is a 
state actor, making it unnecessary for this issue to be judicially determined before resolving the merits 
of the First Amendment claims in this case.  658 F.3d 614, 616 (7th Cir. 2011). 
6 531 U.S. 288 (2001).  
7 Id. at 298.  
8 Id. at 291. 
9 Id. at 307 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
10 Id. at 291, 300. 
11 Id. at 301. 
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the Illinois High School Association (IHSA) is a state actor because of the 
“overwhelmingly public character” of its member schools, 85% of which are 
public schools.12  In a case in which the panel majority did not address this issue, 
Judge Posner concluded that the Indiana High School Athletic Association 
(IHSAA), whose membership is “composed primarily of public schools,” is a 
state actor.13  A Wisconsin federal district court denied the Wisconsin Interscho-
lastic Athletic Association’s (WIAA) motion to dismiss a complaint alleging its 
violation of a student’s federal constitutional rights because the WIAA’s “direct 
influence upon the school's athletic programs” makes it “clear that the [WIAA 
is] . . .  functioning ‘under color of’ state law.”14 
 After Brentwood Academy, in Bukowski v. Wisconsin Interscholastic 
Athletic Ass’n,15 a Wisconsin court of appeals ruled that the plaintiff did not 
prove the WIAA is a state actor because he offered no evidence of “extensive 
entwinement” between the Wisconsin State Board of Education or public 
schools and the WIAA.16  The court observed that the WIAA is not a state actor 
even if it received federal funds, which is alone insufficient to establish state 
action.17  However, this unpublished opinion has no precedential authority.  Be-
cause virtually all Wisconsin public schools with interscholastic athletic pro-
grams are a member of the WIAA (and collectively constitute a majority of its 
members), and their principals and administrators probably are extensively in-
volved in its rule-making and decision-making authority, the WIAA is likely to 
be judicially found to be a state actor when record evidence of “extensive en-
twinement” with its member public schools is established.   
Wisconsin courts and the Seventh Circuit have expressed a reluctance to 
interfere judicially with the contractual relationship between a state high school 
athletic association and its member schools.  In School District of Slinger v. 
Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, a Wisconsin appellate court held that 
the WIAA’s constitution, bylaws, and rules establish a contract between the 
WIAA and its member schools.18  Because these documents gave the WIAA’s 
Board of Control “unfettered power” with “no effort to limit that authority with 
                                                          
12 Griffin High Sch. v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 822 F.2d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 1987).  See also Menora v. 
Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 683 F.2d 1030, 1032 (7th Cir. 1982) (IHSA does not contest the district court’s 
ruling that it is a state actor on appeal, so “there is no issue of state action before us.”).   
13 Crane v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 975 F.2d 1315, 1326 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J., dissent-
ing).  
14 Leffel v. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 398 F. Supp. 749, 750 (E.D. Wis. 1975).  
15 2007 WI App 1, 298 Wis. 2d 246, 726 N.W.2d 356. 
16 Id. at ¶¶ 10–11. 
17 Id. at ¶ 11. 
18 563 N.W.2d 585, 590 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).  
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any strict criteria”19 when aligning athletic conferences, it rejected a member 
school’s allegation that the Board breached its implied contractual right to a 
“‘reasonable’” conference affiliation.20  The court concluded “the WIAA con-
stitution, by-laws and rules on conference realignment do not provide individual 
members with a contractual right to a ‘reasonable’ conference alignment.”21  
In Griffin High School v. Illinois High School Ass’n,22 the Seventh Circuit 
rejected a private, religious school’s claims that the IHSA’s new transfer rules, 
which bar transfer students from participating in interscholastic athletics for one 
year unless their parents changed residence from one school district to another, 
but makes an exception for students who transfer from a private to public school 
if no undue influence is involved, violate the equal protection and due process 
clauses.23  Because the transfer rules are facially neutral and do not burden the 
free exercise of religion or the right of parents to educate their children, the court 
applied a rational basis test to both claims.24  It found the transfer rules rationally 
furthered the IHSA’s legitimate objective of placing “public schools on an equal 
footing with private schools with regard to student recruitment, without aban-
doning the goal of preventing undue influence on transfer students”25 and do not 
deny equal protection of the law.26    
The Griffin court concluded the transfer rules do not violate the school’s 
due process rights: 
 
As an IHSA member, Griffin was free to submit amendments 
or proposals to the association.  It has not done so, and accord-
ing to the IHSA, Griffin has never attended meetings of the leg-
islative body of the IHSA. Griffin received the process that was 
due: notice of the proposed regulation and the right to partici-
pate in the IHSA decisionmaking [sic] process through fair and 
democratic procedures.27 
 
There are no published federal or state cases resolving disputes between the 
                                                          
19 Id. at 591.  
20 Id. at 588, 591. 
21 Id. at 591.  
22 822 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1987).   
23 Id. at 673–74. 
24 Id. at 674–76. 
25 Id. at 675.  
26 Id. at 676. 
27 Id.   
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WIAA and high school athletes.  There are, however, a few cases in which the 
Seventh Circuit decided claims brought by high school athletes against the 
IHSA or IHSAA.  Although it is difficult to make any broad generalizations 
based on such a small number of cases, it is notable that the court recognizes 
that participation in interscholastic athletics is an important part of a student’s 
high school education and has affirmed the granting of injunctive relief to ena-
ble athletic participation in appropriate cases. 
Crane v. Indiana High School Athletic Ass’n is one of the rare federal ap-
pellate court cases finding that a state high school athletic association applied 
its athlete eligibility rules in an arbitrary and capricious manner in violation of 
state private association laws.28  In Crane, applying Indiana law, the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s permanent injunction prohibiting the Indiana 
High School Athletic Association (IHSAA) from declaring a student who 
moved from one divorced parent’s residence to the other’s residence, thereby 
requiring him to change public schools, ineligible to play varsity sports at his 
new school for one year.29  The decision to have him move to live with his father 
was made by his parents based on their belief that the move was in his best 
interests.30  It was undisputed that this move was not motivated by any athletics 
reasons.31  Finding that the rule was “poorly drafted,” with important terms 
“conspicuously undefined,” the court determined “the IHSAA is attempting to 
find definitions for those phrases that will allow it to declare Ryan, and others 
like him, ineligible—regardless of whether his transfer was athletically moti-
vated.”32  Observing that the student appeared to be eligible pursuant to another 
part of the rule, it stated, “The IHSAA’s inconsistency is aggravated by the fact 
that it does not publish any type of written opinion or reasoning for its eligibility 
decisions to member schools.”33  The majority ruled the IHSAA’s interpretation 
and application of its transfer student eligibility rule to the plaintiff was arbitrary 
and capricious in violation of Indiana law.34   
Crane is significant because it requires state high school athletic association 
                                                          
28 975 F.2d 1315, 1326 (7th Cir. 1992). 
29 Id. at 1317–18. 
30 Id. at 1317. 
31 Id.  
32 Id. at 1325.  
33 Id.   
34 Id. at 1326.  Thus, the majority did not consider “whether the rules run afoul of [federal] equal 
protection or due process and express[ed] no opinion on these issues,” as the district court had ruled.  
Id.  In dissent, Judge Posner expressed concern that the majority’s ruling based on state private associ-
ation law would “subject to fish-eyed scrutiny by federal judges applying a vague norm of reasonable-
ness,” “every interpretation, every application, of every such rule—that could be thought to interfere 
with the family, or rather with a particular family.”  Id. at 1327 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
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eligibility rules to be clear and unambiguous, reasonably interpreted in light of 
their legitimate objectives, and consistently applied.35  It also suggests that the 
governing body’s rules, interpretations, and applications should be published to 
provide guidance to its member schools, students, and parents.36  Moreover, this 
case recognizes that “participation in competitive high school athletics ha[s] 
emotional and psychological benefits that [can] not easily be quantified” and 
“money damages [may] not adequately compensate [a student] for the lost op-
portunity to [participate] in the state” championship competition, thereby justi-
fying permanent injunctive relief in appropriate cases. 37   
In Washington v. Indiana High School Athletic Ass’n, the Seventh Circuit 
upheld a preliminary injunction enjoining the IHSAA from enforcing its “eight 
semester” rule and denying a learning disabled student from playing interscho-
lastic basketball during the second semester of the 1998–1999 school year. 38  
Pursuant to this rule, a student is automatically ineligible to participate in any 
interscholastic sports after eight semesters from his first day of high school en-
rollment even if the student was not enrolled for the full eight semesters.39  The 
plaintiff had temporarily dropped out of high school because of his learning 
disability during this eight-semester period.40   
Applying the federal disability discrimination laws,41 the court concluded 
an individualized inquiry is necessary to determine if waiver of this rule is a 
required reasonable accommodation of his learning disability, or a fundamental 
alteration of its eight semester rule the IHSAA is not required to make.42  It ruled 
that permitting the student to play basketball is a reasonable accommodation 
that would not fundamentally alter the rule’s legitimate objectives of “promot-
ing competitive equity, protecting students’ safety, creating opportunities for 
                                                          
35 See id. at 1325.  Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit explained that “for a student athlete in public 
school, membership in IHSAA is not voluntary, and actions of the IHSAA arguably should be held to 
a stricter standard of judicial review” than those of a private sport governing body that does not have 
monolithic regulatory authority.  Freeman v. Sports Car Club of Am., Inc., 51 F.3d 1358, 1363 (7th Cir. 
1995).  
36 See Crane, 975 F.2.at 1325. 
37 Id. at 1326.  
38 181 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir. 1999).  
39 Id. at 852. 
40 Id. 
41 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012); Title II of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012).    
42 Washington, 181 F.3d at 851–52.  This determination is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
subsequent ruling that a sports governing body’s refusal to consider an athlete’s personal circumstances 
“in deciding whether to accommodate his disability runs counter to the clear language and purpose of 
the ADA.”  PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 688 (2001).  
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younger students,” and ensuring academics are paramount to athletics.43  The 
court observed that “waiver of the rule in [plaintiff’s] case has promoted his 
education” because he “reentered [sic] school because of basketball, has im-
proved his grades in part due to the influence of basketball and his coach, and 
is even considering going to college.”44 
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit has not been as receptive to athletes’ 
claims that a state high school athletic association violated their federal consti-
tutional rights.  In Menora v. Illinois High School Ass’n, the panel majority va-
cated a preliminary injunction prohibiting the IHSA from preventing orthodox 
Jewish males from playing basketball while wearing yarmulkes on their heads.45  
Adopting a test that balances the students’ religious liberty interests and benefits 
of playing interscholastic basketball with the IHSA’s safety concerns, it ruled 
the plaintiffs did not satisfy “the burden of proving that their First Amendment 
rights were infringed by the [IHSA’s] no-headwear rule,”46 despite the lack of 
any documented cases of a fall caused by a falling yarmulke.47  However, the 
majority ordered the district court to retain jurisdiction to provide plaintiffs with 
“an opportunity to propose to the [IHSA] a form of secure head covering that 
complies with Jewish law yet meets [its] safety concerns.”48   
Similarly, it is difficult for athletes to prevail on claims asserting that a pub-
lic high school, which is a state actor, violated their federal constitutional rights.  
Although public schools must not infringe their due process, equal protection, 
First Amendment (e.g., freedom of association, expression, and religious lib-
erty), Fourth Amendment (freedom from unreasonable searches), and other pro-
tected rights, high school athletes have been successful in relatively few Seventh 
Circuit or Wisconsin federal district court cases—which is consistent with the 
sports law jurisprudence of other circuit courts.   
Although there is no constitutional liberty or property right to participate in 
interscholastic sports,49 in Butler v. Oak Creek-Franklin School District,50 a 
                                                          
43 Washington, 181 F.3d at 842, 852.  
44 Id. at 852.  
45 683 F.2d 1030, 1031–32, 1036 (7th Cir. 1982). 
46 Id. at 1035.  
47 Id. at 1034. 
48 Id. at 1035.  Dissenting, Judge Cudahy concluded the district court “properly resolved the question 
before him in favor of the plaintiffs” and stated, “[T]he effective foreclosure of the plaintiffs from 
interscholastic basketball—their schools’ only interscholastic sport—is a significant, if not severe, bur-
den and deprivation.”  Id. at 1037 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).   
49 Smith v. Chippewa Falls Area Unified Sch. Dist., 302 F. Supp. 2d 953, 957 (W.D. Wis. 2002).  
50 116 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1056 (E.D. Wis. 2000) (denying student’s request for a preliminary injunc-
tion); 172 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1128 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (granting and denying in part school’s motion for 
summary judgment).  
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Wisconsin federal court recognized that “the opportunity to participate in high 
school extracurricular activities is a valuable part of a complete educational ex-
perience.”51  It found a “reasonable likelihood” that a student who was allowed 
to participate in high school athletics “had a legitimate expectation—and thus 
an entitlement—created by independent state sources, of being allowed to con-
tinue participating so long as he adhered to the terms of the [school’s] Athletic 
Code and other pertinent rules and regulations.”52  Thus, the student has a prop-
erty right in continued sports participation that can be taken away only if a pub-
lic school provides appropriate due process.53   
Butler upheld the authority of high schools to sanction athletes for miscon-
duct outside of school hours and off campus, if necessary, to maintain appropri-
ate standards of conduct and student decorum.54  It establishes a comprehensive 
framework for analyzing whether a school has satisfied the procedural due pro-
cess requirements to prevent a student from participating in interscholastic ath-
letics as a disciplinary sanction for violating its athletic code and other applica-
ble rules.55  Prior to suspending a student from athletic participation, a school 
must provide notice of the specific rule and conduct that violates it,56 as well as 
“the opportunity to give his side of the story,” although a hearing is not re-
quired.57  After a suspension from participation in athletics, “a prompt hearing 
and a prompt decision without appreciable delay”58 before an impartial deci-
sion-maker is required.59  The court held that the participation of the school’s 
athletic director, who had imposed the suspension, in the deliberations of the 
Coaches’ Council, which had conducted the hearing, violated due process.60  
The hearing body’s decision must be based on evidence proving it was, at least, 
more likely than not the student violated the particular rule,61 which, according 
                                                          
51 Butler, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 1050. 
52 Id. at 1049.  
53 Id. at 1045, 1049. 
54 Id. at 1056. 
55 Id. at 1050–55. 
56 Butler v. Oak Creek Franklin Sch. Dist., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1112 (citing Riggan v. Midland 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 86 F. Supp. 2d 647, 658 (W.D. Tex. 2000)).  
57 Butler, 116 F. Supp.2d at 1051–52.  
58 Id. at 1053.  
59 Butler, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1115–16. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 1119.  Implicitly applying these requirements, another Wisconsin federal court concluded,  
 
The undisputed facts establish that plaintiff was afforded procedural due process.  He was 
allowed to engage in “give-and-take” with the school administrators investigating his case 
at the initial investigation stage and at all levels of appeal provided for in the athletic code.  
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to the court, must be more than simply being arrested, pleading no contest, or 
remaining silent about the charged offense.62  Even if the student admits the rule 
violation, he must be given an opportunity to be heard regarding the appropriate 
discipline and any mitigating factors justifying a reduction in the length of sus-
pension from athletic participation.63 
Public schools cannot violate substantive due process by requiring a student 
to forego a constitutionally protected liberty interest in order to participate in 
interscholastic athletics. However, only fundamental liberty rights such as those 
expressly enumerated in the Constitution’s Bill of Rights and a limited category 
of non-enumerated rights will trigger more than rational basis judicial scru-
tiny.64  For example, in Hayden ex rel. A.H. v. Greensburg Community School 
Corp.,65 the Seventh Circuit ruled that, although “the manner in which [a stu-
dent] wears his hair is a cognizable aspect of personal liberty . . . . [It] is not a 
fundamental right.”66  Therefore, a high school’s hair policy for athletes is sub-
ject to only very deferential rational basis judicial scrutiny.67  
Although high school athletes have privacy rights that constitute a liberty 
interest protected by the Due Process Clause, as well as the Fourth Amend-
ment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures, the Seventh Circuit 
has ruled they have a diminished expectation of privacy, which gives public 
schools significant latitude in implementing drug testing programs.  In Schaill 
v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., the Seventh Circuit upheld random, suspi-
cionless testing for recreational drugs as a condition of participation in inter-
scholastic athletics. 68  The court determined that suspicionless taking and test-
ing of athletes’ urine along with limited disclosure to school officials implicated 
                                                          
Defendants presented the evidence upon which they reached their determination and plain-
tiff was permitted to respond to that evidence and to give his own version of the facts.  
Although plaintiff may believe that defendants’ athletic code is draconian, nothing in the 
undisputed facts supports an inference that defendants’ decision to suspend plaintiff from 
athletic competition was arbitrary and capricious, as plaintiff argues.  
 
Smith v. Chippewa Falls Area Unified Sch. Dist., 302 F. Supp. 2d 953, 958 (W.D. Wis. 2002).  
62 Butler, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1123–27.  
63 Id. at 1113–15.  
64 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (The Supreme Court has characterized “the 
rights to marry, . . . to have children, . . . to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children, . . . 
to marital privacy, . . . to use contraception, . . . to bodily integrity, . . . and to abortion” as fundamental 
liberty rights.).  
65 743 F.3d 569 (7th Cir. 2014). 
66 Id. at 575–76.  
67 Id. at 576. 
68 864 F.2d 1309, 1310, 1324 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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their privacy interests, but “‘communal undress’ inherent in athletic participa-
tion,” required physical exams, and extensive regulation of interscholastic 
sports creates “reduced expectations of privacy.”69  The school’s interests in 
protecting athletes’ health and safety outweighed this limited infringement of 
their privacy rights.70  According to the court, “[b]ecause of their high visibility 
and leadership roles, it is not unreasonable to single out athletes . . . for special 
attention with respect to drug usage,”71 which does not violate their due process 
and Fourth Amendment rights.  Applying a similar balancing test, the Supreme 
Court subsequently upheld the constitutionality of random drug testing of high 
school athletes for recreational drugs.72 
The Seventh Circuit and Wisconsin courts have rejected athletes’ equal pro-
tection claims against public school districts alleging unequal treatment of indi-
viduals on the playing field.  In O’Connor v. Board of Education,73 the Seventh 
Circuit held that athletic conference rules requiring separate teams for boys and 
girls in contact sports does not violate the equal protection rights of a girl who 
wanted to play on the boys’ team.74  It determined that “[s]eparate but equal” 
teams are substantially related to the important governmental objective of max-
imizing interscholastic sports participation by both genders.75  In N.T. ex rel. 
Tabbert v. School District of Westfield,76 a Wisconsin federal district court re-
jected the claim of a female basketball player that her coach’s yelling at her 
more than other girls on the team and benching her violated her equal protection 
rights.77  Applying rational basis standard, because no gender discrimination 
was alleged, the court upheld the coach’s discretionary decisions regarding 
“how best to coach her team” and to achieve her legitimate goal of winning 
games rather than giving each member the same amount of playing time.78  
By contrast, courts have been more receptive to challenges to rules regulat-
ing athletes’ off-field conduct that results in gender discrimination.  In Hayden 
v. Greenburg Community School Corp., the Seventh Circuit held the boys’ bas-
ketball coach’s hair-length policy, which required boys to have shorter hair than 
                                                          
69 Id. at 1318.  
70 Id. at 1321. 
71 Id. at 1320.  
72 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 650, 652–53, 665 (1995).  
73 645 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1981). 
74 Id. at 579, 582. 
75 Id. at 581.  
76 No. 11–CV–00556, 2013 WL 1191903 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 21, 2013). 
77 Id. at *4–5. 
78 Id. 
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players on the girls’ basketball team, violated the boys’ equal protection rights.79  
The coach’s policy imitated the one established by legendary basketball coach 
John Wooden and required boys’ hair to be cut above the collar, ears, and eye-
brows to promote team unity and a “‘clean cut’” image.80  The court character-
ized this policy, which burdened boys more than girls, as a form of gender dis-
crimination that requires an “exceedingly persuasive” justification (i.e., 
important interest) that is substantially furthered by the policy.81  Although “sex-
differentiated standards consistent with community norms . . . part of a compre-
hensive, evenly-enforced grooming code that imposes comparable burdens on 
both males and females alike”82 would satisfy this standard, the panel majority 
found “no rational, let alone exceedingly persuasive, justification . . . for re-
stricting the hair length of male athletes alone.”83 
Following other courts,84 the Seventh Circuit has held that unequal treat-
ment of female high school athletes compared to boys playing the same sport 
may violate Title IX’s prohibition against gender discrimination in athletic pro-
grams offered by schools receiving federal funds.85  In Parker v. Franklin 
County Community School Corp.,86 the court ruled that several Indiana public 
high schools’ longstanding tradition of scheduling significantly more boys’ var-
sity basketball games on weekend nights than girls’ basketball games is sub-
stantial enough to deny equal athletic opportunities on a program-wide basis by 
                                                          
79 743 F.3d 569, 572, 582 (7th Cir. 2014). 
80 Id. at 572, 584. 
81 Id. at 579–80, 582. 
82 Id. at 581.  
83 Id. at 582.  It observed that the challenged “policy prohibits far more than an Age-of-Aquarius, 
Tiny-Tim, hair-crawling-past-the-shoulders sort of hair style—it compels all male basketball players to 
wear genuinely short hair,” and that “one or two men on this court might find themselves in trouble 
with [the coach] for hair over the ears.”  Id. at 581–82.  Dissenting, Judge Manion observed that the 
school’s athletic code provision regarding hair styles is the same for all female and male athletes except 
for hair length, and that “[r]equiring men, but not women, to keep their hair at a certain length has never 
been held to be unequally burdensome.”  Id. at 586 (Manion, J., dissenting).  
84 McCormick ex rel. Geldwert v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 280, 302 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(season scheduling decisions that deprived girls, but not boys, of opportunity to compete in regional 
and state championships violated Title IX); Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 178 
F.Supp.2d 805, 807, 851 (W.D. Mich. 2001), aff’d on appeal, 459 F.3d 676, 695 (6th Cir. 2006) (high 
school athletic association violated equal protection rights of female student-athletes by scheduling 
athletic seasons and tournaments for girls’ sports during less advantageous times of academic year than 
boys’ athletic seasons).   
85 Parker v. Franklin Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 667 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2012).  See also Title IX 
provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation 
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance.”  20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2013).  
86 See generally Parker, 667 F.3d 910. 
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disadvantaging girls basketball players, absent any offsetting, comparably better 
treatment of female athletes than male athletes in any other aspects of their ath-
letic programs.87  For example, during the 2009–10 season, 95% of the boys’ 
games, but only 53% of the girls’ games, were scheduled on Friday and Satur-
day nights, which attracted much larger crowds, accompanied by cheerleaders 
and the pep band in an exciting, supportive environment.88  This disparity neg-
atively impacted the girls’ basketball players, resulting in disproportionate aca-
demic burdens (i.e., less time to do homework), a smaller audience of spectators, 
and feelings of inferiority because of their much larger number of weekday 
games.89  The court recognized “these harms are not insignificant and may have 
the effect of discouraging girls from participating in sports in contravention of 
the purposes of Title IX.”90 
III.  COLLEGE SPORTS 
 There is a dearth of significant Wisconsin cases regarding intercollegiate 
athletics, but the Seventh Circuit has decided several important cases that define 
the legal relationship between a university and its student-athletes as well as 
apply federal civil rights (e.g., Title IX, Rehabilitation Act of 1972) and antitrust 
laws to college sports.  
 Consistent with other jurisdictions,91 in Ross v. Creighton University,92 
the Seventh Circuit recognized there is a contractual relationship between a uni-
versity and its student-athletes consisting of written and oral promises that may 
be both express and implied.93  Applying Illinois law, the court ruled that a stu-
dent-athlete alleging a breach of contract claim “must point to an identifiable . . 
. promise” the university failed to honor.94  Although a university’s decision to 
admit an academically deficient student-athlete and the general quality of edu-
cation it provides are not subject to judicial review for policy reasons,95 the court 
                                                          
87 Id. at 914, 922, 924. 
88 Id. at 914. 
89 Id.  
90 Id. at 923.  
91 See, e.g., Jackson v. Drake Univ., 778 F. Supp. 1490, 1493 (S.D. Iowa 1991); Taylor v. Wake 
Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379, 382 (N.C. App. 1972).  
92 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992).  
93 Id. at 416–17 (citing Zumbrun v. Univ. of Southern Cal., 101 Cal. Rptr. 499, 504 (1972); Wick-
strom v. N. Idaho Coll., 725 P.2d 155, 157 (Idaho 1986)). 
94 Id. at 416–17.  
95 Id. at 415.  The court observed there is no “satisfactory standard of care by which to evaluate an 
educator,” “inherent uncertainties . . . about the cause and nature of damages,” a potential “flood of 
litigation against schools,” and concern about judicial oversight of “the day-to-day operations of 
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concluded a university’s alleged failure to perform a promised service states a 
breach of contract claim:  
 
We read Mr. Ross’ complaint to allege more than a failure of 
the University to provide him with an education of a certain 
quality.  Rather, he alleges that the University knew that he was 
not qualified academically to participate in its curriculum.  
Nevertheless, it made a specific promise that he would be able 
to participate in a meaningful way in that program because it 
would provide certain specific services to him.  Finally, he al-
leges that the University breached its promise by reneging on 
its commitment to provide those services and, consequently, ef-
fectively cutting him off from any participation in and benefit 
from the University’s academic program.  To adjudicate such a 
claim, the court would not be required to determine whether 
Creighton had breached its contract with Mr. Ross by providing 
deficient academic services.  Rather, its inquiry would be lim-
ited to whether the University had provided any real access to 
its academic curriculum at all.96 
 
 Ross, however, cautioned that “courts should not ‘take on the job of su-
pervising the relationship between colleges and student-athletes or creating in 
effect a new relationship between them.’”97  This view is consistent with general 
reluctance of courts to expand the nature and scope of contractual obligations a 
university owes to student-athletes beyond the express terms of an athletic 
scholarship and any specific oral promises it has made.98 
 When applying federal civil rights statutes, the Seventh Circuit has been 
very deferential to the authority of a university to operate its intercollegiate ath-
letics program and to determine the individual sports it offers as well as the 
eligibility requirements for its student-athletes.  
 As have all other federal appellate courts,99 the Seventh Circuit has re-
jected claims that elimination of male intercollegiate teams violates Title IX and 
                                                          
schools.”  Id. at 414 (citations omitted).  
96 Id. at 417. 
97 Id. (citation omitted). 
98 See, e.g., Jackson v. Drake Univ., 778 F. Supp. 1490, 1493 (S.D. Iowa 1991) (Student-athlete’s 
“financial aid agreements do not implicitly contain a right to play basketball.”).  
99 See, e.g., Miami Univ. Wrestling Club v. Miami Univ., 302 F.3d 608, 615–16 (6th Cir. 2002); 
Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d 1042, 1048–49 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Neal, 198 F.3d at 769–
70); Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 770 (9th Cir. 1999)).  
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denies equal protection of the law. In Kelley v. Board of Trustees, University of 
Illinois,100 the Seventh Circuit upheld the University of Illinois’ decision to 
eliminate its men’s swimming team (as well as two other men’s teams and one 
women’s team) for budgetary reasons and to comply with Title IX’s require-
ment that equal athletic participation opportunities be provided for both gen-
ders.101  It found that eliminating the men’s swimming team does not violate 
Title IX because men’s intercollegiate athletic participation opportunities at the 
university would continue to be more than substantially proportionate to their 
undergraduate enrollment.102  On the other hand, the court concluded the uni-
versity’s decision to retain its women’s swimming program is a valid, reasona-
ble response necessary to ensure women have substantially proportionate ath-
letic participation opportunities pursuant to Title IX.103  The court ruled that 
cutting men’s sports to comply with Title IX does not deny male athletes equal 
protection of the law because remedying discrimination in the provision of in-
tercollegiate athletic participation opportunities is an important government ob-
jective that is furthered by complying with Title IX’s substantial proportionality 
compliance test.104  
 Rejecting the male athletes’ assertion that Title IX requires athletic par-
ticipation opportunities for the underrepresented gender to be increased rather 
than reducing those for the overrepresented gender, the Seventh Circuit ex-
plained: 
 
Title IX’s stated objective is not to ensure that the athletic op-
portunities available to women increase.  Rather its avowed 
purpose is to prohibit educational institutions from discriminat-
ing on the basis of sex.  And the remedial scheme established 
by Title IX and the applicable regulation and policy interpreta-
tion are clearly substantially related to this end.105 
 
 Similarly, in Boulahanis v. Board of Regents, the Seventh Circuit held 
that Illinois State University’s elimination of its men’s wrestling and soccer 
teams solely to comply with Title IX by providing substantially proportionate 
                                                          
100 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994).  
101 Id. at 269–72. 
102 Id. at 270. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 272–73. 
105 Id. at 272.  
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athletic participation opportunities for both its female and male students does 
not constitute prohibited gender discrimination. 106  Rejecting plaintiffs’ attempt 
to distinguish Kelley on the ground there is a legally dispositive difference be-
tween eliminating athletic teams for financial reasons rather than gender, the 
court stated: 
 
That distinction ignores the fact that a university’s decision as 
to which athletic programs to offer necessarily entails budget-
ary considerations. . . . To say that one decision is financial, 
while another is sex-based, assumes that these two aspects can 
be neatly separated.  They cannot. . . . Ultimately, both the de-
cision of the University in this case and the decision of the Uni-
versity of Illinois at issue in Kelley were based on a combina-
tion of financial and sex-based concerns that are not easily 
distinguished.107 
 
 In Knapp v. Northwestern University,108 the Seventh Circuit ruled that a 
university has valid authority to establish reasonable medical eligibility require-
ments that its student-athletes must satisfy as a condition of being eligible to 
participate in its intercollegiate athletics program.109  In a landmark case apply-
ing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to college athletics, the court held that requir-
ing student-athletes to be medically cleared by a university’s team physician is 
a legitimate physical qualification for participation in intercollegiate sports.110  
Northwestern University refused to permit a student who had suffered cardiac 
arrest while playing competitive basketball and was medically disqualified by 
its team physician from playing on its intercollegiate basketball team.111 
Although other physicians medically cleared him to play intercollegiate 
basketball, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the university’s decision does not 
violate the Rehabilitation Act, which permits a person with a physical disability 
to be excluded from participation in an activity to prevent “a significant risk of 
personal physical injury.”112  The court characterized its judicial role narrowly: 
                                                          
106 198 F.3d 633, 636–38 (7th Cir. 1999).  
107 Id. at 637.  
108 101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996). 
109 Id. at 482 (quoting Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 407 (1979)). 
110 Id. at 484. 
111 Id. at 476–77. 
112 Id. at 483 (citing Chiari v. City of League City, 920 F.2d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 1991); Bentivegna 
v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 622 (9th Cir. 1982)).  
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“[I]n the midst of conflicting expert testimony regarding the degree of serious 
risk of harm or death, the court’s place is to ensure that the exclusion or disqual-
ification . . . was individualized, reasonably made, and based upon competent 
medical evidence.”113  The court explained that “medical determinations of this 
sort are best left to team doctors and universities as long as they are made with 
reason and rationality and with full regard to possible and reasonable accom-
modations.”114  However, it stated, “[W]e are not saying Northwestern’s deci-
sion necessarily is the right decision,” and acknowledged, “all universities need 
not evaluate risk the same way.”115  
 Consistent with other federal appellate courts,116 the Seventh Circuit has 
given the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) broad latitude to 
preserve the “amateur” nature of intercollegiate athletics by holding that stu-
dent-athlete eligibility rules are per se legal and do not violate federal antitrust 
law.  In Banks v. NCAA, the majority rejected an antitrust challenge to two 
NCAA amateurism rules that render college football players ineligible if they 
declare for the NFL draft or agree to be represented by an agent in the sport of 
football. 117  It affirmed the dismissal of the complaint because it did not allege 
the rule had anti-competitive effects in an identifiable relevant market.118  Find-
ing that “the no-draft rule and other like NCAA regulations preserve the bright 
line of demarcation between college and ‘play for pay’ football,”119 the majority 
concluded:  
 
The no-draft rule has no more impact on the market for college 
football players than other NCAA eligibility requirements such 
as grades, semester hours carried, or requiring a high school 
diploma.  They all constitute eligibility requirements essential 
to participation in NCAA sponsored amateur athletic competi-
tion. . . . Banks’ allegation that the no-draft rule restrains trade 
                                                          
113 Id. at 485.  
114 Id. at 484. 
115 Id. at 485. 
116 See, e.g., Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 185–87 (3d Cir. 1998); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 
F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1988).  But see O’Bannon v. NCAA, No. C 09–3329 CW, 2014 WL 3899815, 
at *7, *37 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014) (evidencing the first federal case invalidating a NCAA amateur 
eligibility rule, specifically a prohibition against student-athletes’ receiving a share of licensing and 
broadcasting revenues from products incorporating their likenesses on a group basis, because it violates 
antitrust law).  
117 977 F.2d 1081, 1083–84, 1093–94 (7th Cir. 1992).  
118 Id. at 1094. 
119 Id. at 1090 (citation omitted).  
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is absurd.  None of the NCAA rules affecting college football 
eligibility restrain trade in the market for college players be-
cause the NCAA does not exist as a minor league training 
ground for future NFL players but rather to provide an oppor-
tunity for competition among amateur students pursuing a col-
legiate education.120 
 
 However, Judge Flaum, who vigorously dissented in Banks, and other 
Seventh Circuit judges121 expressed a willingness to characterize NCAA stu-
dent-athlete eligibility rules as commercial restraints subject to antitrust scru-
tiny:  
If the no-draft rule were scuttled, colleges that promised their 
athletes the opportunity to test the waters in the NFL draft be-
fore their eligibility expired, and return if things didn’t work 
out, would be more attractive to athletes than colleges that de-
clined to offer the same opportunity.  The no-draft rule elimi-
nates this potential element of competition among colleges, the 
purchasers of labor in the college football labor market.  It cat-
egorically rules out a term of employment that players, the sup-
pliers of labor in that market, would find advantageous.122 
 
 Nevertheless, even if they are deemed to be commercial in nature, the 
Seventh Circuit recently reaffirmed its view that NCAA student-athlete eligibil-
ity rules are valid as a matter of law for purposes of antitrust law.  In Agnew v. 
NCAA,123 Judge Flaum, writing for a unanimous panel, stated: 
 
A certain amount of collusion in college [sports] is permitted 
because it is necessary for the product to exist.  Accordingly, 
when an NCAA bylaw is clearly meant to help maintain the 
                                                          
120 Id. at 1089–90.   
121 See e.g., United States v. Walters, 997 F.2d 1219, 1225 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 
The NCAA depresses athletes’ income—restricting payments to the value of tuition, room, 
and board, while receiving services of substantially greater worth.  The NCAA treats this 
as desirable preservation of amateur sports; a more jaundiced eye would see it as the use of 
monopsony power to obtain athletes’ services for less than the competitive market price. 
 
Id. 
122 Banks, 977 F.2d at 1095 (citations omitted). 
123 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012).  
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“revered tradition of amateurism in college sports” or the 
“preservation of the student-athlete in higher education,” the 
bylaw will be presumed procompetitive, since we must give the 
NCAA “ample latitude to play that role.”124 
 
 Agnew distinguished NCAA limits on length of athletic scholarships and 
caps on the number a college team may grant, which it characterized as com-
mercial restraints that are not presumptively procompetitive, from student-ath-
lete eligibility rules:  
 
For the purposes of college sports, and in the name of amateur-
ism, we consider players who receive nothing more than edu-
cational costs in return for their services to be “unpaid athletes.”  
It is for this reason, though, that the prohibition against multi-
year scholarships does not implicate the preservation of ama-
teurism, for whether or not a player receives four years of edu-
cational expenses or one year of educational expenses, he is still 
an amateur.  It is not until payment above and beyond educa-
tional costs is received that a player is considered a “paid ath-
lete.” . . . The NCAA's limitation on athlete compensation be-
yond educational expenses . . . directly advances the goal of 
maintaining a “clear line of demarcation between intercolle-
giate athletics and professional sports,” . . . and thus is best cat-
egorized as an eligibility rule aimed at preserving the existence 
of amateurism and the student-athlete.125 
IV.  PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 
The Seventh Circuit and the Wisconsin Supreme Court have decided 
several important cases involving the professional sport industry, some 
of which have established leading precedents; whereas, a few have been 
reversed by the United States Supreme Court.  Although it is difficult to 
make broad generalizations because these cases consider several different 
bodies of law, their respective professional sports law jurisprudence ap-
pears to be fairly conservative in that it is supportive of private sport gov-
erning body autonomy, as well as direct state regulation of professional 
                                                          
124 Id. at 342–43 (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984) 
(the only Supreme Court case applying federal antitrust law to the NCAA)). 
125 Id. at 344–45 (quoting Banks, 977 F.2d at 1089). 
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sports and sports-specific state legislation.  On the other hand, these 
courts generally have demonstrated a reluctance to use general federal 
statutes such as the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)126 
and the Sherman Act127 to regulate professional sports.  
Because professional sports leagues and governing bodies are private asso-
ciations, the Seventh Circuit has held they should be given substantial latitude 
in governing their internal affairs, which justifies very deferential judicial re-
view of their rules and decisions that are challenged by league clubs and indi-
vidual members of the association.  In Charles O. Finley v. Kuhn,128 the Seventh 
Circuit upheld the authority of Major League Baseball (MLB) Commissioner 
Bowie Kuhn to disapprove the sale of three Oakland Athletics player contracts 
to the Boston Red Sox and New York Yankees, which he found to be “‘not in 
the best interests of baseball,’” primarily because these transactions harmed the 
Oakland club and lessened competitive balance among MLB teams “through 
the buying of success by the more affluent clubs,” such as the Red Sox and 
Yankees.129  Finding the MLB clubs had given Commissioner Bowie Kuhn con-
tractually broad authority to take action and make decisions, which in his sole 
judgment, are consistent with the best interests of baseball, it concluded 
“‘[w]hether he was right or wrong is beyond the competence and the jurisdiction 
of this court to decide.’”130  Observing that the judiciary generally “‘will not 
intervene in questions involving the enforcement of bylaws and matters of dis-
cipline in voluntary associations,”131 the court created two exceptions in which 
judicial review and relief is appropriate: “[(]1) [W]here the rules, regulations or 
judgments of the association are in contravention to the laws of the land or in 
disregard of the charter or bylaws of the association and [(]2) where the associ-
ation has failed to follow the basic rudiments of due process of law.”132 
In Olinger v. United States Golf Ass’n, the Seventh Circuit rejected the 
claim of a professional golfer, whose degenerative medical condition signifi-
cantly impaired his ability to walk, that the United States Golf Association’s 
(USGA) refusal to allow him ride in a golf cart during the United States Open 
golf tournament violates the ADA. 133  The official rules of golf do not prohibit 
                                                          
126 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12134 (2012).  
127 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).  
128 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978). 
129 Id. at 531–32.  
130 Id. at 539–40. 
131 Id. at 542 (quoting Am. Fed’n of Technical Eng’rs v. La Jeunesse, 347 N.E.2d 712, 715 (Ill. 
1976)).  
132 Id. at 544. 
133 205 F.3d 1001, 1001, 1007 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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the use of golf carts and permit tournament competition organizers to determine 
whether to permit their use, which the USGA declined to do.134  Although the 
ADA requires that “reasonable modifications” be made to enable physically dis-
abled athletes such as the plaintiff to participate in a sport, modifications that 
would “fundamentally alter” the sport are not required.135  Determining “that 
physical and mental fatigue and a uniform set of rules for all golfers are integral 
parts of championship-level golf,”136 the court ruled that requiring the USGA to 
allow plaintiff to use a cart would fundamentally alter the nature of the United 
States Open golf tournament, which the ADA does not require.137  The panel 
reasoned “the decision on whether the rules of the game should be adjusted to 
accommodate [the plaintiff] is best left to those who hold the future of golf in 
trust.”138 
Charles O. Finley is a landmark case establishing the narrow scope of judi-
cial review under the state common law of private associations,139 which has 
been frequently cited and followed by courts in other jurisdictions.140  However, 
Olinger subsequently was effectively overruled by PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin.141  
In Martin, the Supreme Court determined that, according to the rules of golf, 
walking is not an essential part of even championship golf competitions, so the 
use of carts would not necessarily constitute a fundamental alteration of the 
game.142  It ruled that an individualized determination must be made by the 
sport’s governing body to determine whether permitting a physically disabled 
golfer would provide a competitive advantage, thereby fundamentally altering 
a championship golf tournament.143    
 The Seventh Circuit and the Wisconsin Supreme Court have been simi-
larly deferential regarding the authority of state administrative bodies to directly 
regulate professional sports and state legislatures to enact statutes that benefit 
professional sports organizations.  
                                                          
134 Id. at 1003. 
135 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2012).  
136 Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1006.  
137 Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
138 Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1007.  
139 See generally Charles O. Finley & Co., Inc. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978). 
140 See generally Crouch v. Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 845 F.2d 397 (2nd Cir. 
1998); Oakland Raiders v. NFL, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 266 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
141 532 U.S. 661 (2001).  
142 Id. at 666 n.3, 685, 689 (citing U.S. Golf Ass’n, Rules and Decisions, USGA, 
http://www.usga.org/Rule-Books/Rules-of-Golf/Appendix-I/ (Dec. 2, 2014). 
143 Id. at 688. 
MITTEN FINAL FORMATTED 12/23/2014  1:39 PM 
2014] SEVENTH CIRCUIT AND WISCONSIN  227 
In Dimeo v. Griffin,144 a 7–4 en banc decision, the Seventh Circuit upheld 
random, suspicionless testing of jockeys, harness racing drivers, and other par-
ticipants in horse racing for recreational drugs.145  The majority rejected these 
parties’ contention that the Illinois Racing Board’s drug testing policy violated 
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable search and sei-
zures.146  It concluded the Board has a substantial interest in protecting the safety 
of these participants who may be injured or killed in accidents caused by illegal 
drug use, as well as preventing potential lost state tax revenues if public interest 
and betting in horse racing declined because jockeys and other participants were 
using drugs and causing adverse perceptions of the fairness of races.147  Despite 
“no proven cases of lethal or other serious accidents caused by drug-using horse-
race participants, or any other public scandals resulting from such use,”148 they 
ruled that the Board’s interests outweighed “the incremental loss of privacy”149 
imposed on the plaintiffs, who are participants in “a heavily regulated activ-
ity”150 that could be subjected to frequent medical exams to ensure their health 
and safety.151  
In Libertarian Party of Wisconsin v. State,152 the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the Stadium Act, a state statute permitting the 
establishment of local baseball park districts in any county with a population in 
excess of 500,000 and contiguous counties and authorizing them to build, fi-
nance, and operate professional baseball stadia.153  Only Milwaukee County, 
where the Milwaukee Brewers played their games, and surrounding counties 
were within the class created by this legislation.154  A key issue for purposes of 
determining its constitutionality was “whether the legislation creating local 
baseball park districts satisfies the public purpose doctrine,” not “whether the 
game of baseball or the Milwaukee Brewers serve a public purpose.”155  The 
                                                          
144 943 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1991). 
145 Id. at 680–81, 685. 
146 Id. at 685. 
147 Id. at 683. 
148 Id. at 684.  
149 Id. at 683. 
150 Id. at 681. 
151 Id. at 682.  The dissenting judges noted “there is not the slightest evidence of drug-related acci-
dents in this horse-racing case” and expressed “doubt that preventing the worst horse race accident in 
history would justify setting aside the Constitution.”  Id. at 688–89 (Wood, J., dissenting).  They la-
mented, “It is too bad we cannot ask the horses about horse racing, but they are not talking.”  Id. at 691.  
152 546 N.W.2d 424 (Wis. 1996).  
153 Id. at 428, 440. 
154 Id. at 429. 
155 Id. at 433. 
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Wisconsin legislature’s purpose was “to promote the recreational opportunities 
that flow from an economically viable professional baseball team and economic 
development associated with baseball.”156  The court stated the legislature’s 
opinion regarding “what constitutes a public purpose . . . must be given great 
weight,”157 and its determination should be judicially overruled only if “‘mani-
festly arbitrary or unreasonable.’”158  It followed the view adopted by a majority 
of other jurisdictions and held “the fact that a private entity such as the Brewers 
will benefit from the Stadium Act does not destroy [its] predominant public pur-
pose.”159 
Both the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit have made sig-
nificant contributions to the development of professional sports antitrust law 
jurisprudence, one of the most important forms of public law regulation of the 
professional sports industry.  
In State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc.,160 the Wisconsin Supreme Court broadly 
construed the scope of professional baseball’s antitrust immunity to include 
state antitrust law as well as federal antitrust law,161 which was subsequently 
confirmed by Flood v. Kuhn.162  Despite concluding that the refusal of the Na-
tional League and the failure of the American League to put a replacement team 
in Milwaukee when the Braves moved to Atlanta is a concerted refusal to deal 
in violation of Wisconsin antitrust law, the majority ruled that the United States 
Constitution precluded its application.163  Some of its members concluded it 
would violate the Supremacy Clause because “application and enforcement of 
a state antitrust law to decisions of the league as to the location of franchises 
and membership in the league would conflict with the national policy in this 
segment of interstate commerce”164 based on United State Supreme Court prec-
edent that professional baseball is immune from federal antitrust law.165  Others 
determined that doing so would violate the Commerce Clause because “the 
                                                          
156 Id. at 431.  
157 Id. at 433–34 (citing State ex rel. Warren v. Reuter, 170 N.W.2d 790, 794 (Wis. 1969)).  
158 Id. at 435 (quoting State ex rel. Hammermill Paper Co. v. La Plante, 205 N.W.2d 784, 798 (Wis. 
1973)).  
159 Id. at 434.  
160 144 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1966).  
161 Id. at 18. 
162 407 U.S. 258, 284–85 (1972) (State antitrust regulation of baseball would conflict with federal 
antitrust law immunity and burden interstate commerce, thereby violating the Supremacy and Com-
merce Clauses.).  
163 Milwaukee Braves, 144 N.W.2d at 7, 18. 
164 Id. at 17.  
165 See Toolson v. N. Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953); Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. 
v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208–09 (1922). 
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structure of the leagues, their decisions as to their own membership, location of 
franchises, and things of that nature, require uniformity of regulation, and since 
organized baseball operates widely in interstate commerce, the regulation, if 
there is to be any, must be prescribed by Congress.”166 
In United States Trotting Ass’n v. Chicago Downs Ass’n, the Seventh Cir-
cuit followed other federal appellate courts applying the rule of reason to chal-
lenged sports industry rules and internal regulation under Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act, which prohibits agreements that unreasonably restrain interstate 
trade.167  It reversed the district court’s ruling that threats by the United States 
Trotting Association (USTA), a horse racing record keeping and rule-making 
organization, to impose sanctions on its members who raced horses at two tracks 
that were receiving the benefits of its services without paying for them is a per 
se illegal group boycott.168  The panel concluded that the more flexible rule of 
reason, which balances the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of the 
challenged restraint on a case-by-case basis, generally should be applied.169  It 
adopted the position of other circuit courts, recognizing that “in organized sports 
‘interdependence,’ ‘cooperation,’ and at least ‘a few rules are essential to sur-
vival;’”170 therefore, sports industry restraints should not be presumed to be per 
se illegal.171  The Seventh Circuit noted that preventing free-riding may be a 
procompetitive justification necessary to cover the costs of effective internal 
sports industry regulation.172  
There are two noteworthy Seventh Circuit antitrust cases applying Section 
1 to the rules and collective decisions of a major professional sports league that 
allegedly restrain trade among its member clubs. An important threshold issue 
is whether league clubs are separate economic entities whose collective action 
is subject to Section 1, or whether a sports league and its members are an eco-
nomically integrated single business enterprise whose conduct is not covered by 
Section 1 (i.e., the “single entity defense”).  Contrary to other circuit courts,173 
                                                          
166 Milwaukee Braves, 144 N.W.2d at 18 (citing Graves v. N.Y. ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 479 
n.1 (1939)).  The dissenting judges “conclude[d] there is neither federal pre-emption of the Wisconsin 
law nor is the remedy sought by the State of Wisconsin [(movement of the Braves back to Milwaukee 
or placement of an expansion baseball club in Milwaukee)] of a nature that [it] will burden interstate 
commerce.”  Id. at 18–19 (Heffernan, J., dissenting).  
167 665 F.2d 781, 790 (7th Cir. 1981).  
168 Id. at 783–85, 790–91. 
169 Id. at 787–88, 790. 
170 Id. at 789–90 (citation omitted). 
171 Id. at 790. 
172 Id. at 789. 
173 Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 
726 F.2d 1381, 1390 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); N. Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 
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the Seventh Circuit adopted the latter view.  
In Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. v. National Basketball Ass’n, the Sev-
enth Circuit suggested the single entity defense should not be rejected simply 
because American professional sports leagues are composed of independently 
owned and operated member clubs that collectively govern their internal af-
fairs.174  The court proposed that a functional approach, which analyzes whether 
league clubs are economic competitors in the alleged relevant market that is 
restrained, be used to determine the appropriateness of applying Section 1 on a 
case-by-case basis.175  In other words, whether the particular challenged conduct 
(in this case, an NBA rule limiting the number of superstation broadcasts of a 
club’s games that may be nationally broadcast in a season) has the requisite 
degree of economic integration to be considered that of a single economic entity 
requires facet-by-facet analysis of each league’s operations.176 
Judge Easterbrook observed that the NBA is closer to a single firm than a 
group of independent firms when acting in the broadcast market:  
 
Whether the NBA itself is more like a single firm, which would 
be analyzed only under § 2 of the Sherman Act, [which prohib-
its monopolization or attempted monopolization,] or like a joint 
venture, which would be subject to the Rule of Reason under § 
1, is a tough question . . . .  It has characteristics of both.  Unlike 
the colleges and universities that belong to the National Colle-
giate Athletic Association, . . . the NBA has no existence inde-
pendent of sports.  It makes professional basketball; only it can 
make “NBA Basketball” games . . . . From the perspective of 
fans and advertisers (who use sports telecasts to reach fans), 
“NBA Basketball” is one product from a single source even 
though the Chicago Bulls and Seattle Supersonics[, two of the 
NBA’s clubs,] are highly distinguishable, just as General Mo-
tors is a single firm even though a Corvette differs from a Chev-
rolet.  But from the perspective of college basketball players 
who seek to sell their skills, the teams are distinct, and because 
the human capital of players is not readily transferable to other 
sports (as even Michael Jordan learned) the league looks more 
                                                          
670 F.2d 1249, 1257–58 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982).  
174 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 1996).     
175 Id.  
176 Id. at 596, 600. 
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like a group of firms acting as a monopsony.177 
 
 Based on Chicago Professional Sports, in American Needle, Inc. v. Na-
tional Football League, the Seventh Circuit accepted the NFL’s argument that 
its member clubs function as a single economic entity in jointly producing NFL 
football and collectively licensing their trademarked merchandise, which does 
not constitute concerted action under Section 1.178  The court held “the record 
amply establishes that since 1963, the NFL teams have acted as one source of 
economic power—under the auspices of NFL Properties—to license their intel-
lectual property collectively and to promote NFL football.”179      
Because this holding created a conflict among circuit courts regarding the 
single entity defense, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari.  The Court 
reversed the Seventh Circuit’s ruling and concluded:  
 
The NFL teams do not possess either the unitary decisionmak-
ing [sic] quality or the single aggregation of economic power 
characteristic of independent action.  Each of the teams is a sub-
stantial, independently owned, and independently managed 
business. . . .  The teams compete with one another, not only on 
the playing field, but to attract fans, for gate receipts, and for 
contracts with managerial and playing personnel.  
Directly relevant to this case, the teams compete in the market 
for intellectual property.  To a firm making hats, the Saints and 
the Colts are two potentially competing suppliers of valuable 
trademarks.  When each NFL team licenses its intellectual 
property, it is not pursuing the “common interests of the whole” 
league but is instead pursuing interests of each “corporation it-
self;”. . . teams are acting as “separate economic actors pursu-
ing separate economic interests,” and each team therefore is a 
potential “independent cente[r] of decisionmaking [sic].”. . . 
Decisions by NFL teams to license their separately owned 
trademarks collectively and to only one vendor are decisions 
that “depriv[e] the marketplace of independent centers of deci-
                                                          
177 Id. at 599.   
178 Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 538 F.3d 736, 744 (7th Cir. 2008).  
179 Id. 
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sionmaking [sic],” . . . and therefore of actual or potential com-
petition.180 
 
Nevertheless, Chicago Professional Sports established precedent holding 
that league restrictions on the licensing or sale of a member club’s intellectual 
property rights must be evaluated under a full rule of reason analysis, which has 
been followed by other circuit courts.181  The Seventh Circuit held that proof the 
NBA has market power is required to prove the NBA’s limit on the number of 
games a club may televise on a superstation and its tax on televised superstation 
games restrains trade.182  As the court explained, the plaintiff must prove there 
are no reasonable entertainment substitutes for NBA games from the perspec-
tive of television viewers (or no alternative means for companies to advertise 
their products to consumers with the same demographic characteristics):   
 
[T]here is no time slot when NBA basketball predominates.  
The NBA’s season lasts from November through June; games 
are played seven days a week.  This season overlaps all of the 
other professional and college sports, so even sports fanatics 
have many other options.  From advertisers’ perspective—
likely the right one, because advertisers are the ones who actu-
ally pay for telecasts—the market is even more competitive.  
Advertisers seek viewers of certain demographic characteris-
tics, and homogeneity is highly valued. . . .  If the NBA assem-
bled for advertisers an audience that was uniquely homogene-
ous, or had especially high willingness-to-buy, then it might 
have market power even if it represented a small portion of air-
time.183 
 
The Seventh Circuit also decided two Sherman Act Section 2 cases against 
the owner/operator of a sports stadium contending that their policies constitute 
illegal monopolization or attempted monopolization of a local market. These 
rulings are significant because relatively few cases have addressed this issue in 
                                                          
180 Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 196–97 (2010) (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independ-
ence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984)). 
181 See Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 334 (2d Cir. 2008); Mad-
ison Square Garden, L.P. v. NHL, 270 Fed. Appx. 56, 58 (2d. Cir. 2008). 
182 Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 600–01 (7th Cir. 1996). 
183 Id.  
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the context of professional sports.  In Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz,184 the court 
ruled that the owner of the Chicago Stadium, the largest indoor sports arena in 
Chicago at the time, violated Section 2 by using its “‘strategic dominance’ of 
the market in suitable arenas” to prevent another bidder from competing to pur-
chase the Chicago Bulls NBA club.185  It affirmed the lower court’s finding that 
“the relevant market was competition for the presentation of live professional 
basketball in Chicago,”186 while rejecting defendants’ assertion “that the parties 
must be in head-to-head competition in the relevant market . . . before the anti-
trust laws will apply.”187  In Elliott v. United Center, the Seventh Circuit held 
that “‘[f]ood sales within the United Center’” (the current home of the Chicago 
Blackhawks and Bulls teams) is not a relevant market. 188  The court rejected the 
Section 2 claim of vendors who sold peanuts outside the United Center that the 
arena’s policy prohibiting patrons from bringing food into the arena is “an ille-
gal attempt to monopolize food sales inside the arena and in the surrounding 
geographic area.”189  Consistent with Chicago Professional Sports, it “rejected 
the proposition that a firm can be said to have monopoly power in its own prod-
uct, absent proof that the product itself has no economic substitutes.”190 
 In addition to developing a substantial body of law governing the relation-
ship between a professional sports league or organization and its members, the 
Seventh Circuit authored a leading case defining the legal duty of care an agent 
is required to satisfy when representing professional athletes.  In Zinn v. Par-
rish,191 the Seventh Circuit ruled that an agent is obligated to use “‘reasonable 
efforts’”192 in obtaining employment for his client as a professional athlete and 
reasonable care in negotiating employment contracts.193  Regarding related ser-
vices such as seeking endorsement contracts and off-season employment for the 
player, the court held that an agent has an implied duty “to make ‘good faith’ 
efforts to obtain what [the player] sought” and “such efforts constitute full per-
formance of [his] obligations.”194  Absent any guarantees or promises, an agent 
                                                          
184 807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986). 
185 Id. at 527, 530, 562. 
186 Id. at 530, 562. 
187 Id. at 531. 
188 126 F.3d 1003, 1003 (7th Cir. 1997). 
189 Id.   
190 Id. at 1005.  
191 644 F.2d 360 (7th Cir. 1981). 
192 Id. at 365.  
193 Id. at 366. 
194 Id. 
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who has “at all times acted in good faith, with a willingness ‘to provide assis-
tance within his ability,’”195 is not liable for unsuccessful results.  
V.  OLYMPIC SPORTS 
 The Seventh Circuit’s Olympic sports jurisprudence is more developed 
than any other federal appellate court and is the source of several significant 
precedents establishing the generally accepted legal principle that American 
courts have a very limited role in regulating Olympic sports, particularly athlete 
eligibility disputes.  
 In Michels v. United States Olympic Committee,196 the Seventh Circuit 
held that the Amateur Sports Act of 1978 (ASA)197 does not provide an athlete 
with an express or implied private right of action to have an athletic eligibility 
or participation dispute resolved by a federal court.198  The International Weight-
lifting Federation (IWF), the international governing body for the sport of 
weightlifting, suspended an American weightlifter for two years because he 
tested positive for testosterone, a banned substance, during the Pan American 
Games.199  Because of his suspension, the United States Wrestling Federation 
(USWF), the national governing body (NGB) for the sport of weightlifting in 
the U.S., refused to permit him to compete for a spot on the American weight-
lifting team that would compete at the 1984 Olympic Games.200  The athlete’s 
claim that his test results were invalid was rejected by both the IWF and the 
United States Olympic Committee (USOC) in separate internal administrative 
proceedings, and his suspension was upheld.201  Thereafter, the athlete asserted 
the USOC violated the ASA.202   
 The court concluded the ASA’s legislative history “clearly reveals that 
Congress intended not to create a private cause of action under the Act” for 
athletes.203  Although the originally proposed version of the ASA contained an 
“Amateur Athlete’s Bill of Rights,” it was eliminated after “‘strong resistance 
                                                          
195 Id. 
196 741 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1984).  
197 36 U.S.C. § 371 (2012).  In 1998, Congress revised the ASA, which was re-named the Ted 
Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act.  See 36 U.S.C. § 220501 (2013).  
198 Michels, 741 F.2d at 156.  The ASA now explicitly states, “[N]either this paragraph nor any other 
provision of this chapter shall create a private right of action under this chapter.” 36 U.S.C § 
220505(b)(9).  
199 Michels, 741 F.2d at 156. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 156–57. 
202 Id. at 156. 
203 Id. at 157 (citations omitted).  
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by the high school and college communities.’”204  The legislative history indi-
cated “‘the compromise reached was that certain substantive provisions on ath-
letes’ rights would be included in the USOC Constitution, and not in the 
bill.’”205  Thus, the court dismissed the athlete’s claims under the ASA.206  
 Concurring, Judge Posner stated that the USOC’s Constitution should 
not be characterized as a federal law, the violation of which would create a fed-
eral cause of action for athletes.207  Doing so would contravene the compromise 
created by the ASA, which requires the USOC to establish procedures for re-
solving a dispute between an NGB and an athlete relating to his or her oppor-
tunity to participate in the Olympic Games.208  He explained: “Any doubt on 
this score can be dispelled by the reflection that there can be few less suitable 
bodies than the federal courts for determining the eligibility, or the procedures 
for determining the eligibility, of athletes to participate in the Olympic 
Games.”209  He noted the athlete’s dispute ultimately is with the IWF, an inter-
national body that is not a member of the USOC, rather than the USWF.210  
Judge Posner observed: 
 
It is not by accident that the statute does not require the [USOC] 
to establish machinery for resolving disputes between athletes 
and nonmembers. . . .  The USOC has no control over nonmem-
bers.  The [IWF] can thumb its collective nose at the [USOC].  
It can do more: if the USOC tried to put Michels on the U.S. 
Olympic Weightlifting team in defiance of the IWF’s expul-
sion, the IWF could ask the International Olympic Committee 
to disqualify the team.  Michels might succeed only in destroy-
ing the Olympic hopes of all the American weightlifters.211 
 
                                                          
204 Id. at 158.  
205 Id. (citation omitted). 
206 Id.  
207 Id. at 159 (Posner, J., concurring).  In S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U. S. Olympic Comm., the 
Supreme Court subsequently ruled that the USOC is a private entity, thereby implicitly validating Judge 
Posner’s conclusion that the USOC Constitution is not federal law.  See 483 U.S. 522, 547 (1987). 
208 Michels, 741 F.2d at 159 (Posner, J., concurring). 
209 Id.   
210 Id. 
211 Id.  
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 In Lindland v. United States Wrestling Ass’n,212 the Seventh Circuit rec-
ognized that the ASA provides an Olympic sport athlete with the right to submit 
an eligibility dispute with an NGB to final and binding arbitration in accordance 
with the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) if 
it is not resolved by the USOC to his or her satisfaction.213  It confirmed an 
arbitration award (Burns award) finding that the USA Wrestling Association’s 
grievance procedures for protesting the results of a match to determine a spot 
on the U.S. Olympic team were flawed and ordering a rematch as a remedy.214  
The court confirmed the Burns award because (1) the arbitrator had valid juris-
diction to resolve the dispute between the athlete challenging those procedures 
and USA Wrestling; and (2) there was no evidence it was the product of any 
corruption, fraud, or bias, which would have been valid grounds for vacating 
the award.215  Thus, the wrestler who won the rematch, Matt Lindland, was en-
titled to be USA Wrestling’s nominee for the 2000 Olympic team in his weight 
class.216 
 The Seventh Circuit vacated a subsequent arbitration award (Campbell 
award) brought by the wrestler who lost the rematch, Keith Sieracki, which di-
rected USA Wrestling not to implement the Burns award based on the arbitra-
tor’s determination that the result of the original match was valid and its griev-
ance procedures were adequate.217  The court concluded the ASA “does not 
authorize arbitration about the propriety of another arbitrator’s decision”218 be-
cause the ASA “would be self-destructive if it authorized such proceedings, 
which would lead to enduring turmoil (as happened here) and defeat the stat-
ute’s function of facilitating final resolution of disputes.”219  It also noted that 
                                                          
212 227 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2000).  
213 Id. at 1003–04 (referencing ASA § 220529(a)). 
214 Id. at 1008. 
215 Id. at 1001–02.  See also U. S. Wrestling Fed’n v. Wrestling Div. of AAU, Inc., 605 F.2d 313, 
320 (7th Cir. 1979) (confirming an AAA arbitration award resolving a dispute concerning which of two 
organizations is entitled to be designated as the NGB for wrestling because alleged interest or bias of 
arbitration panel’s chair is “too ‘remote, uncertain, and speculative’ to require the arbitration decision 
to be set aside”).  
216 Lindland, 227 F.3d at 1005. 
217 Id. at 1003.  Sieracki was not a party to the Burns arbitration proceeding because the then-current 
provisions of the ASA only provided for arbitration between an aggrieved athlete and an NGB, rather 
than arbitration among the athletes.  After Lindland, the USOC’s Bylaws were amended to provide that 
appropriate notice be given to all athletes who may be adversely affected by the arbitration.  These 
athletes may choose to participate in the arbitration as a party.  An athlete who receives notice is bound 
by the arbitration decision even if he or she chooses not to participate in the arbitration proceeding.  
United States Olympic Committee Bylaw 9.8 (2013). 
218 Lindland, 227 F.3d at 1003.  
219 Id. at 1004.  
MITTEN FINAL FORMATTED 12/23/2014  1:39 PM 
2014] SEVENTH CIRCUIT AND WISCONSIN  237 
AAA’s Commercial Rules provide that “an ‘arbitrator is not empowered to re-
determine [sic] the merits of any claim already decided.’”220  Regarding “ath-
letic justice,” the court ruled that an Olympic sports arbitrator is not permitted 
to disregard applicable rules: “Arbitrators are not ombudsmen; they are author-
ized to resolve disputes under contracts and rules, not to declare how the world 
should work in the large.”221  If this occurs, the resulting award will be judicially 
vacated rather than confirmed and given enforceable legal effect.222  
 Slaney v. International Amateur Athletic Federation,223 another leading 
precedent established by the Seventh Circuit, illustrates that U.S. courts will not 
resolve the merits of athlete eligibility or participation disputes with either na-
tional (e.g., USOC, NGBs) and international sports governing bodies (e.g., In-
ternational Olympic Committee (IOC)), or international federations (IFs).224  In 
this case, accomplished middle-distance runner Mary Decker Slaney sought to 
judicially challenge an International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF) Arbi-
tral Tribunal’s (Tribunal) determination that urine test results, revealing she had 
a T/E ratio greater than six to one, constituted a positive test for testosterone in 
violation of the IAAF’s anti-doping rules and justify suspending her from com-
petition in IAAF-sanctioned events.225  She asserted several state contract and 
tort law claims against the USOC and IAAF.226  
 The Seventh Circuit ruled the ASA preempts Slaney’s state law claims 
against the USOC, which did not assert it was violating its own eligibility rules, 
because “eligibility decisions fall within the USOC’s exclusive jurisdiction over 
all matters pertaining to United States participation in the Olympic Games.”227  
It concluded “the method by which the USOC determines the eligibility of [its] 
athletes” is not subject to judicial review.228  According to the court, the need 
for uniformity in determining questions of Olympic athlete eligibility and avoid-
ing potentially conflicting judicial interpretations by different courts justified 
                                                          
220 Id. (quoting AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSTRUCTION: ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION 
PROCEDURES, Rule 48(a) (Oct. 1, 2009)).  
221 Id.  
222 Id. at 1003 (citing Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)).  
223 244 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2001).  
224 Id. at 601. 
225 Id. at 585–87.   
226 Id.  Slaney also asserted a Racketeer Influended and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) claim against 
the USOC, which was rejected because her complaint did not plead all of the necessary elements of this 
federal statutory claim.  Id. at 596–01. 
227 Id. at 595–96.  
228 Id. at 596.  
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this conclusion.229   
 The court held that the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention),230 an international treaty 
to which the U.S. is a party, precluded Slaney from re-litigating the same issues 
decided by the Tribunal, a foreign arbitration proceeding in Monaco (which also 
is a party to the New York Convention).231  The Tribunal found Slaney commit-
ted a doping violation because she did not prove by clear and convincing evi-
dence that her elevated T/E ratio was caused by a pathological or physiological 
condition.232  Because her state law claims would require judicial determination 
of whether she “was properly found guilty of a doping offense,” the Seventh 
Circuit concluded that reconsidering these claims “would undermine or nullify 
the Tribunal’s decision” in violation of the New York Convention.233  It ex-
plained: “Our judicial system is not meant to provide a second bite at the apple 
for those who have sought adjudication of their disputes in other forums and are 
not content with the resolution they have received.”234  The court rejected her 
contention that the Tribunal’s arbitration award is unenforceable because she 
had been denied the fair opportunity to present her case and the award itself 
violated U.S. public policy.235  It found she had received a fundamentally fair 
hearing and required Slaney to prove her elevated T/E ratio was caused by a 
pathological or physiological condition did not violate the “exceedingly nar-
row” public policy defense recognized by U.S. courts.236  
VI.  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES 
 In general, the Seventh Circuit and Wisconsin courts have broadly de-
fined the scope of the intellectual property rights of sports clubs, leagues, and 
organizations as well as athletes.237  
                                                          
229 Id. at 595 (citing Dolan v. U.S. Equestrian Team, Inc., 608 A.2d 434, 437 (N.J. App. Div. 1992); 
Walton-Floyd v. USOC, 965 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998)). 
230 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).  
231 Slaney, 244 F.3d at 588, 594. 
232 Id. at 589. 
233 Id. at 590.  
234 Id. at 591.  
235 Id. at 591, 593–94. 
236 Id. at 593–94.  
237 See infra notes 235–74 and accompanying text.  It is interesting to note that a Wisconsin federal 
magistrate judge concluded that Amerik Wojciechowski is the “likely author” (i.e., creator) of the fa-
mous “cheese wedge hat” worn with pride by thousands of fans of Wisconsin professional sports teams, 
particularly the Green Bay Packers.  Foamation, Inc. v. Wedeward Enters. Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1287, 
1297 (E.D. Wis. 1996).  Observing that no one may have a valid copyright in the cheese wedge hat 
because it was commercially produced and distributed without the required affixed notice of copyright, 
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The Seventh Circuit and its federal district courts generally have provided 
a significant degree of legal protection to sports teams’ trademarks under the 
Lanham Act, a federal statute prohibiting the unauthorized use of another’s 
trademark that creates a likelihood of confusion in the marketplace.238  Boston 
Professional Hockey Ass’n v. Reliable Knitting Works, Inc.239 is part of a group 
of mid-1970s cases that “recognizes a trademark as a product and confers broad 
property rights on its owner beyond the right to prevent likely consumer confu-
sion regarding the origin or source of merchandise bearing the trademark.”240  
In this 1973 case, a Wisconsin federal district court ruled that defendant’s un-
authorized sale of hats with emblems bearing the Boston Bruins NHL team’s 
BRUINS and circled “B” marks, which are federally registered for its profes-
sional ice hockey games, violates the Lanham Act.241  It found that defendant’s 
conduct “was likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive,”242 
despite no evidence of “misrepresenting its caps as caps manufactured by plain-
tiff or licensees of plaintiff’s . . . marks” or any consumer confusion regarding 
the source of its goods.243   
 The Seventh Circuit has held that a professional sports club has the ex-
clusive right to use its team name even after relocating to another city and to 
prevent unauthorized usage that creates a likelihood of consumer confusion.  In 
Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club Ltd.,244 the 
court enjoined a Canadian Football League team from calling itself the “‘Balti-
more CFL Colts’” because this name was shown to create a likelihood of con-
sumer confusion regarding the team’s nonexistent relationship with the “‘Indi-
anapolis Colts,’” an NFL team that left Baltimore and moved to Indianapolis 
nine years ago.245  It explained:  
 
If “Baltimore CFL Colts” is confusingly similar to “Indianapo-
lis Colts” by virtue of the history of the Indianapolis team and 
                                                          
the court noted that “the public interest is generally best served by robust competition . . . in the cheese 
wedge hat market” and that the public benefits “from an abundant quantity, and ever improving quality, 
of cheese wedge hats.”  Id. at 1298.  
238 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(3)(D) (2006). 
239 178 U.S.P.Q. 274 (E.D. Wis. 1973).  
240 Matthew J. Mitten, From Dallas Cap to American Needle and Beyond: Antitrust Law’s Limited 
Capacity to Stitch Consumer Harm from Professional Sports Club Trademark Monopolies, 86 TUL. L. 
REV. 901, 908 (2012).  
241 Bos. Prof’l, 178 U.S.P.Q., at 276–78. 
242 Id. at 278 (citations omitted).  
243 Id. at 277. 
244 34 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 1994).  
245 Id. at 411, 416. 
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the overlapping product and geographical markets served by it 
and by the new Baltimore team, the latter’s use of the aban-
doned mark would infringe the Indianapolis Colts’ new mark.  
The Colts’ abandonment of a mark confusingly similar to their 
new mark neither broke the continuity of the team in its differ-
ent locations—it was the same team, merely having a different 
home base and therefore a different geographical component in 
its name—nor entitled a third party to pick it up and use it to 
confuse Colts fans, and other actual or potential consumers of 
products and services marketed by the Colts or by other Na-
tional Football League teams, with regard to the identity, spon-
sorship, or league affiliation of the third party, that is, the new 
Baltimore team.246 
 
 Similarly, in Johnny Blastoff, Inc. v. Los Angeles Rams Football Co.,247 
the Seventh Circuit ruled that plaintiff’s proposed use of the “St. Louis Rams” 
as the name of a fictional, cartoon sports team would infringe the Los Angeles 
Rams NFL club’s right to continue using “Rams” to identify the team after its 
upcoming relocation to St. Louis.248  Observing that the club was founded as the 
Cleveland Rams in 1937, moved to become the Los Angeles Rams in 1946, and 
was relocating to become the St. Louis Rams in 1995, the court determined: 
“[T]he Rams organization and the NFL had a long-established priority over the 
use of the ‘Rams’ name in connection with the same professional football team, 
regardless of urban affiliation.”249  
 In contrast, in Illinois High School Ass’n v. GTE Vantage, Inc.,250 the 
Seventh Circuit narrowly construed the Illinois High School Association’s 
(IHSA) trademark rights in “March Madness,” which it had been using since 
the early 1940s to identify its high school basketball tournament.251  It held that 
the IHSA could not prevent the NCAA from using “March Madness” as the 
name of its college basketball tournament or licensing third parties to use this 
term for commercial purposes.252  In 1982, broadcaster Brent Musburger used 
“March Madness” to refer to the NCAA’s basketball tournament, which became 
                                                          
246 Id. at 413.   
247 188 F.3d 427 (7th Cir. 1999).  
248 Id. at 430, 435, 437–39. 
249 Id. at 431, 435. 
250 99 F.3d 244 (7th Cir. 1996). 
251 Id. at 245, 247. 
252 Id. at 248. 
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widely used by the national media and public.253  Because “‘March Madness’” 
is a name “the public has affixed to something other than, as well as, the Illinois 
high school basketball tournament;” the court characterized it as a dual-use term 
and “that for the sake of protecting effective communication,” and that the 
“IHSA’s rights do not extend to the NCAA tournament and to merchandise such 
as Vantage’s game that is sold in connection with that tournament.”254 
  Consistent with the broad scope of protection generally provided to 
sports trademarks, the Seventh Circuit also has broadly construed the copyright 
and contractual rights of producers of sporting events.  In Baltimore Orioles, 
Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n,255 the Seventh Circuit held that 
Major League Baseball (MLB) clubs own the copyright to televised baseball 
games, which confers exclusive rights to the televised performances of the play-
ers.256  Unlike the underlying games, the telecasts of the games are copyrighted 
original and creative audiovisual works within the subject matter of copyright257 
that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression because they are simultane-
ously videotaped when broadcast.  The court determined:  
 
Because the Players are employees and their performances be-
fore broadcast audiences are within the scope of their employ-
ment, the telecasts of major league baseball games, which con-
sist of the Players’ performances, are works made for hire 
[under the Copyright Act]. . . .  Thus, in the absence of an agree-
ment to the contrary, the Clubs are presumed to own all of the 
rights encompassed in the telecasts of the games.  The district 
court found that there was no written agreement that the Clubs 
would not own the copyright to the telecasts, and, therefore, 
that the copyright was owned by the Clubs.258 
                                                          
253 Id. at 245. 
254 Id. at 247–48.  
255 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986). 
256 Id. at 673, 677.  The court expressed no opinion regarding whether the copyrights in game tele-
casts “are owned separately by individual clubs or jointly by some combination of clubs,” or whether 
the copyrights “are owned exclusively by the Clubs or jointly by the Clubs and the television stations 
or networks that record and broadcast the games.”  Id. at 673–74 n.18.   
257 The court determined that “telecasts are independent creations,” “filming an event involves cre-
ative labor,” and “telecasts are audiovisual works” under § 102(a)(6) of the Copyright Act.  Id. at 668–
69.  
258 Id. at 670.  The court noted:  
 
Contrary to the Players’ contention, the effect of this decision is not to grant the Clubs per-
petual rights to the Players’ performances.  The Players remain free to attain their objective 
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The Seventh Circuit rejected the MLB players union’s claim that the clubs’ 
unauthorized telecasts of games in which they played violated their publicity 
rights.259  Because the clubs owned the copyright to televised baseball games, it 
ruled that the players’ publicity rights in their game performances were 
preempted by the Copyright Act.260  The court explained:  
 
[O]nce a performance is reduced to tangible form, there is no 
distinction between the performance and the recording of the 
performance for the purpose of preemption under § 301(a).  
Thus, if a baseball game were not broadcast or were telecast 
without being recorded, the Players’ performances similarly 
would not be fixed in tangible form and their rights of publicity 
would not be subject to preemption. . . .  By virtue of being 
videotaped, however, the Players’ performances are fixed in 
tangible form, and any rights of publicity in their performances 
that are equivalent to the rights contained in the copyright of 
the telecast are preempted.261 
 
In Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n v. Gannett Co.,262 the Seventh 
Circuit held that the WIAA, which the parties stipulated is a state actor subject 
to the Federal Constitution, has a property right in its tournament games and its 
grant of exclusive contract rights to stream games over the Internet does not 
violate the First Amendment.263  Finding that “tournament games are a perfor-
mance product of WIAA that it has the right to control,”264 the court determined 
that the “WIAA has the right to package and distribute its performance; nothing 
in the First Amendment confers on the media an affirmative right to broadcast 
entire performances”265 without its authorization.  Observing that the WIAA’s 
media policy permits the media “to talk and write about the events to their 
                                                          
by bargaining with the Clubs for a contractual declaration that the Players own a joint or an 
exclusive interest in the copyright of the telecasts.  
 
Id. at 679 (citation omitted).  
259 Id. at 674–75. 
260 Id.  
261 Id. at 675 (citation omitted). 
262 658 F.3d 614 (7th Cir. 2011).  
263 Id. at 616, 629. 
264 Id. at 616.  
265 Id. at 622. 
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hearts’ content,” it ruled, “What they cannot do is to appropriate the entertain-
ment product that WIAA has created without paying for it.”266 
Like many other states,267 Wisconsin recognizes a common law and statu-
tory268 right of publicity, which provides athletes with the exclusive right to 
commercially exploit and license others to use their respective names, like-
nesses, and other aspects of their persona in connection with the advertising and 
sale of products and services.269  In Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.,270 the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court created a common law right in the “publicity value” 
of one’s name and identity because of the public interest in permitting control 
of “commercial uses of one’s personality and the prevention of unjust enrich-
ment of those who appropriate the publicity value of another’s identity.”271  The 
court ruled that Elroy Hirsch, a nationally prominent former collegiate and pro-
fessional athlete widely known as “Crazylegs” because of his unique style of 
running, had a valid damages claim for the unauthorized use of “Crazylegs’’ to 
market a shaving gel for women.272 
In Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc.,273 the Seventh Circuit held that a Chi-
cago grocery store chain’s advertisement in Sports Illustrated magazine’s com-
memorative issue congratulating former Chicago Bulls player Michael Jordan 
on his recent induction into the basketball hall of fame is commercial speech 
subject to his alleged right of publicity and Lanham Act unfair competition 
claims.274  Concluding that the “ad ha[d] an unmistakable commercial function: 
enhancing the Jewel-Osco brand in the minds of consumers,”275 it reversed the 
lower court’s ruling that the ad is noncommercial speech protected by the First 
Amendment.276  Even though it did not market any specific products to consum-
ers, the court characterized this ad as “a form of image advertising aimed at 
promoting goodwill for the Jewel-Osco brand by exploiting public affection for 
                                                          
266 Id.  
267 See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY 1 §§ 6:1–6:9 (West 
Group ed., 2d ed. 2012).  
268 WIS. STAT. § 995.50 (2011–12). 
269 § 995.50 (2)(b) (2011–12). 
270 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979). 
271 Id. at 134 (citation omitted). 
272 Id. at 131, 137.  The court also held that the facts established a prima facie case of common law 
trade name infringement based on evidence that defendant’s unauthorized use of “Crazylegs” creates a 
likelihood of public confusion regarding Hirsch’s sponsorship of its shaving gel.  Id. at 139–40. 
273 743 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2014). 
274 Id. at 511, 519–20, 522. 
275 Id. at 518.  
276 Id. at 512, 522. 
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Jordan at an auspicious moment in his career.”277  
VII.  TORTS ISSUES 
Most of Wisconsin’s sports law jurisprudence involves tort law issues, par-
ticularly liability for personal injuries to co-participants or spectators during 
sports events, which requires judicial interpretation and application of Wiscon-
sin statutes regarding these issues.  Wisconsin courts also have decided several 
cases regarding the validity of liability waivers for personal injuries suffered 
during recreational sports as well as one of the few U.S. cases concerning the 
legal duty of a state high school athletic association to protect athletes’ health 
and safety.  Sports-related tort issues are generally governed by state law, and 
there are no Seventh Circuit cases considering these issues.   
In Wisconsin, the general common law negligence rule is that a person has 
a legal duty to use reasonable care and is subject to liability for breaching this 
duty.278  In Mohr v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,279 the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals rejected the WIAA’s assertion that it had no legal duty to in-
dependently determine whether the National Federation of High Schools’ Rule 
2–7–2, which permitted (but did not require) the use of starting platforms for 
high school interscholastic swimming events for pools with water depths of 3.5 
feet, established an appropriate level of safety.280  A high school swimmer, who 
was injured when he struck his head during a practice dive off an eighteen-inch 
platform at his school’s pool, alleged the WIAA negligently adopted this rule, 
thereby requiring its member schools to follow the rule and creating the belief 
it was safe to use platforms with 3.5 feet of water.281  Reversing the trial court’s 
grant of summary judgment for the WIAA, the appellate court ruled, “[T]he 
crucial question with regard to the WIAA’s duty is not . . . whether it had a duty 
to make its own assessment of the adequacy of Rule 2–7–2 before adopting it, 
but, rather, whether its conduct in not doing so was consistent with its duty to 
exercise reasonable care.”282 
Regarding the liability of a co-participant for injuring another during a 
                                                          
277 Id. at 519. 
278 See, e.g., Alvarado v. Sersch, 2003 WI 55 ¶ 25, 262 Wis.2d 74, 662 N.W.2d 350, 356 (2003) 
(Cause in fact, damages, and consideration of public policy factors are other elements of a negligence 
claim.).  
279 2004 WI App 5, 269 Wis.2d 302, 674 N.W.2d 576. 
280 Id. at ¶¶ 4, 38, 40, 45. 
281 Id. at ¶¶ 3, 6. 
282 Id. at ¶ 41.  
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sporting event, in Lestina v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co.,283 the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court adopted a negligence standard, which is consistent with its gen-
eral torts jurisprudence but contrary to the majority of other jurisdictions that 
permit recovery only for intentional or reckless conduct.284  It affirmed a jury 
verdict finding defendant negligently injured plaintiff during an adult recrea-
tional soccer league game by “slide tackling” him in violation of the league’s 
rules.285  Acknowledging that few cases allow recovery merely for proof of neg-
ligence because of concern that liability would discourage participation in 
sports, the court nevertheless concluded “the negligence standard, properly un-
derstood and applied, is suitable for cases involving recreational team contact 
sports” and is “sufficiently flexible” to enable vigorous athletic competition.286  
It identified several factors relevant in determining whether a player’s conduct 
is negligent: 
 
[T]he sport involved; the rules and regulations governing the 
sport; the generally accepted customs and practices of the sport 
(including the types of contact and the level of violence gener-
ally accepted); the risks inherent in the game and those that are 
outside the realm of anticipation; the presence of protective 
equipment or uniforms; and the facts and circumstances of the 
particular case, including the ages and physical attributes of the 
participants, the participants’ respective skills at the game, and 
the participants’ knowledge of the rules and customs.287 
 
In response to Lestina, the Wisconsin legislature enacted the following stat-
ute: 
A participant in a recreational activity that includes physical 
contact between persons in a sport involving amateur teams, 
including teams in recreational, municipal, high school and col-
lege leagues, may be liable for an injury inflicted on another 
participant during and as part of that sport in a tort action only 
if the participant who caused the injury acted recklessly or with 
                                                          
283  501 N.W.2d 28 (Wis. 1993). 
284 See MATTHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
PROBLEMS 884 (3d ed. 2013).   
285 Lestina, 501 N.W.2d at 29, 33. 
286 Id. at 33. 
287 Id. (citation omitted). 
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intent to cause injury.288  
 
Wisconsin courts have broadly construed this statute, particularly the terms 
“sport,” “physical contact,” and “amateur teams,” while demonstrating a reluc-
tance to find that conduct injuring a co-participant is actionable.  In Noffke v. 
Bakke,289 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that high school cheerleading is a 
sport for purposes of the statute because it is “‘[a]n activity involving physical 
exertion and skill that is governed by a set of rules or customs,’” which involves 
physical contact because “cheerleaders touch one another.”290  Therefore, a fel-
low cheerleader was immune from negligence liability for allegedly failing to 
properly spot the plaintiff who fell while practicing a cheerleading stunt before 
a basketball game.291  It rejected plaintiff’s argument that the statute applies only 
to “competitive team sports,” specifically “‘aggressive’ [contact] sports such as 
football, hockey, or boxing.” because its language does not have either limita-
tion.292  The court concluded defendant was not reckless, which requires “con-
scious disregard of an unreasonable and substantial risk of serious bodily harm 
to another,” as a matter of law because his conduct was merely inadvertent, un-
skilled, or unreasonable, which does not satisfy this standard.293 
The Wisconsin Courts of Appeals has applied Noffke’s definition of a 
“sport” broadly and extended the statutory scope of co-participant immunity 
from negligence liability to encompass injuries occurring during unorganized 
pick-up games294 and recreational activities such as paintball.295 
                                                          
288 WIS. STAT. § 895.525(4m)(a) (2011–2012).  The same liability standard applies to injuries oc-
curring during athletic competition between “professional teams in a professional league.”  § 
895.525(4m)(b). 
289 2009 WI 10, 315 Wis.2d 350, 760 N.W.2d 156.  
290 Id. at ¶¶ 17, 18 (quoting AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1742 (3d ed. 
1992)).   
291 Id. at ¶ 23. 
292 Id. at ¶¶ 27, 30.  In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Abrahamson, while acknowledging dic-
tionary definitions “plainly suggest that team sports involve competition . . . [and] the cheerleading 
squad . . . did not participate in any organized cheerleading competitions,” explained she agreed with 
the result, which is consistent with “the legislature’s express purpose of ‘decreas[ing] uncertainty re-
garding the legal responsibility for deaths or injuries that result from participation in recreational activ-
ities and thereby to help assure the continued availability in this state of enterprises that offer recrea-
tional activities to the public.”  Id. at ¶¶ 61–62, 65, 67 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).    
293 Id. at ¶¶ 35–37 (quoting Werdehoff v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 600 N.W.2d 214, 222 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1999) (citing Kellar v. Lloyd, 509 N.W.2d 87, 95 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993). 
294 See, e.g., Kleeman v. Emerson, 2011 WI App 1 ¶ 5, 330 Wis.2d 836, 794 N.W.2d 928 (ice 
hockey).  
295 See, e.g., Houston v. Freese, 2012 WI App 97 ¶ 19, 344 Wis.2d 125, 820 N.W.2d 157.  
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Courts have uniformly rejected personal injury claims by sports event spec-
tators under Wisconsin’s “safe-place statute,” which codifies the common law 
negligence standard, by requiring a public building such as a sports facility to 
be “safe,” meaning it provides “such freedom from danger to the life, health, 
safety or welfare of . . . frequenters, or the public . . . as the nature of the . . . 
public building, will reasonably permit.”296  Although non-contractual assump-
tion of the risk is not an affirmative defense to claimed violation of the safe-
place statute, Wisconsin courts effectively hold that spectators assume the in-
herent risks of injury from flying projectiles such as balls and hockey pucks 
going into the seating area of an arena or stadium during sports events pursuant 
to a contributory negligence analysis.297  In accordance with this rationale, 
courts generally have ruled that the organizer or producer of a sporting event 
and the operator or owner of the facility in which it is held are not liable for 
spectator injuries as a matter of law if customary structural safety precautions 
are provided.    
In Powless v. Milwaukee County,298 the Wisconsin Supreme Court deter-
mined that defendants Milwaukee County and the National League Baseball 
Club of Milwaukee were not liable for injury to a spectator who was struck by 
a foul ball while attending a Milwaukee Braves game at Milwaukee County 
Stadium.299  It explained that the stadium owner and club are not insurers of the 
safety of spectators, who know that foul balls frequently enter unscreened areas 
of the stands.300  Finding the position and size of the stadium’s backstop com-
plied with “standards and customs of all major league baseball parks”301 and 
spectators’ interest in obtaining a foul ball as a souvenir is “an integral part of 
the excitement and enjoyment of attending a baseball game,” it noted the trial 
court’s conclusion that requiring defendants “to screen the entire ball park for 
the adequate protection of all persons in the stands would be unreasonable.”302  
In this case, the plaintiff chose not to purchase a seat behind the screen and was 
sitting 234 feet from home plate marking her scorecard when she was hit by the 
foul ball.303  The Supreme Court ruled “that the evidence of [her] contributory 
                                                          
296 WIS. STAT. § 101.01(13) (2011–12). 
297 Under the Wisconsin comparative negligence statute, the plaintiff is barred from recovery of any 
damages if his contributory negligence is “greater than the negligence of the person against whom 
recovery is sought.”  WIS. STAT. § 895.045(1) (2011–12).  
298 94 N.W.2d 187 (Wis. 1959).  
299 Id. at 188, 191. 
300 Id. at 189. 
301 Id. 
302 Id. at 190. 
303 Id. at 188. 
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negligence is so strong that it is unnecessary to decide whether” defendants vi-
olated the safe-place statute.304 
Following Powless, in Moulas v. PBC Productions, Inc.,305 the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals denied recovery to a spectator who was hit by a hockey puck 
while attending a Milwaukee Admirals game at the Bradley Center, whose side-
boards and Plexiglas complied with league rules.306  Affirming the grant of sum-
mary judgment for defendants, the court explained, “[T]he fact that the accident 
occurred does not establish fault.”307  Because plaintiff had attended more than 
ten previous hockey games and seen pucks flying into the stands, it concluded: 
 
Because the risks associated with hockey should be known to 
the reasonable person attending a game, . . .  [plaintiff] was 
aware of the risks, . . . and  because she chose to attend despite 
her knowledge and the warnings espoused, we conclude that 
summary judgment was appropriate.  [Plaintiff’s] contributory 
negligence—as a matter of law—was at least 1% more than any 
of the defendants.308 
 
 Although a contractual waiver of liability or exculpatory clause for per-
sonal injury suffered by a sports participant or spectator is not “invalid per se”309 
under Wisconsin law, such contracts “are not favored by the law because they 
tend to allow conduct below the acceptable standard of care” and will be con-
strued “strictly against the party seeking to rely on them.”310  In Yauger v. Skiing 
                                                          
304 Id. at 191. 
305 570 N.W.2d 739 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).  
306 Id. at 740–41, 745. 
307 Id. at 743. 
308 Id. at 745.  See generally also Shain v. Racine Raiders Football Club, 2006 WI App 257, 297 
Wis. 2d 869, 726 N.W.2d 869 (upholding summary judgment for defendants on safe-place statute claim 
by a youth football coach injured while his team was providing half-time entertainment during a minor 
league professional football game); Heenan v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 2000 WI App 143,237 Wis. 2d 
695, 616 N.W.2d 923 (affirming summary judgment against spectator hit by a hockey puck during 
game at Bradley Center based on Moulas). 
309 Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness Ctr., 2005 WI 4 ¶ 12, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 311–12, 691 N.W.2d 
334, 338.  See also Eder v. Lake Geneva Raceway, 523 N.W.2d 429, 433 n.4 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) 
(invalidating spectator personal injury waiver because defendant’s alleged negligence not contemplated 
by parties at time it was executed, but declining to “make the general statement that exculpatory con-
tracts involving spectators are void as against public policy”).  
310 Yauger v. Skiing Enters., Inc., 557 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Wis. 1996) (citing Richards v. Richards, 513 
N.W.2d 118, 121 (Wis. 1994)). 
MITTEN FINAL FORMATTED 12/23/2014  1:39 PM 
2014] SEVENTH CIRCUIT AND WISCONSIN  249 
Enterprises, Inc.,311 the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that “public policy is 
the germane analysis”312 and two requirements must be satisfied for a liability 
waiver to be enforced: “First, the waiver must clearly, unambiguously, and un-
mistakably inform the signer of what is being waived.  Second, the form, looked 
at in its entirety, must alert the signer to the nature and significance of what is 
being signed.”313 
 Yauger held that the following waiver does not satisfy either require-
ment:  
 
In support of this application for membership, I agree that: 1. 
There are certain inherent risks in skiing and that we agree to 
hold Hidden Valley Ski Area/Skiing Enterprises Inc. harmless 
on account of any injury incurred by me or my Family member 
on the Hidden Valley Ski Area premises.314  
 
The court determined it did not state defendant’s negligence is an inherent 
risk of skiing and conspicuously identify the document as a liability waiver.315  
Therefore, it does not bar plaintiffs’ claim alleging defendant negligently failed 
to pad a ski lift tower causing their ten-year-old daughter’s death from a colli-
sion with it.316  
 Applying Yauger, a Wisconsin federal district court and the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals upheld waivers absolving the organizers of recreational sports 
events from negligence liability for injuries suffered by participants.317  Each 
document was clearly and conspicuously labeled as a “release and waiver of 
liability” and expressly stated participants are accepting the risk of personal in-
jury from the defendant’s negligence.318  Both courts recognized that a waiver 
exempting a party from liability for personal injury caused by recklessness or 
an intentional tort is void as against public policy.319 
                                                          
311  Id. at 60. 
312 Id. at 64. 
313 Id. at 63. 
314 Id. at 61. 
315 Id. at 64. 
316 Id. at 61, 65. 
317 Rose v. Nat’l Tractor Pullers Ass’n, 33 F. Supp. 2d 757, 762 (W.D. Wis. 1998); Niese v. Skip 
Barber Racing Sch., 202 WI App 85 ¶ 6, 252 Wis. 2d 766, 642 N.W.2d 645. 
318 Rose, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 727; Niese, 2002 WI App 85 ¶ 15.  
319 Rose, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 766); Niese, 2002 WI App 85 ¶ 18. 
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 Subsequently, in Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness Center, 320 the Wis-
consin Supreme Court characterized Yauger as establishing two “factors”321 rel-
evant to the public policy analysis of liability waivers.322 It then added a third 
factor, whether there was an “opportunity to bargain in regard to its terms,”323 
but created uncertainty by “not address[ing] whether a single objectionable fac-
tor is sufficient to invalidate an exculpatory clause.”324  Finding it was overly 
broad because it may encompass an unenforceable reckless or intentional act, it 
did “not provide adequate noti[ce] of [its] nature and significance,” and it did 
not give the signatory an opportunity to negotiate its terms,325 the court invali-
dated the following liability waiver: 
  
WAIVER RELEASE STATEMENT  
I AGREE TO ASSUME ALL LIABILITY FOR MYSELF 
WITHOUT REGARD TO FAULT, WHILE AT SWIMWEST 
FAMILIY FITNESS CENTER. I FURTHER AGREE TO 
HOLD HARMLESS SWIMWEST FITNESS CENTER, OR 
ANY OF ITS EMPLOYEES FOR ANY CONDITIONS OR 
INJURY THAT MAY RESULT TO MYSELF WHILE AT 
THE SWIMWEST FITNESS CENTER. I HAVE READ THE 
FOREGOING AND UNDERSTAND ITS CONTENTS.326   
Since Atkins was decided in 2005, there are no reported Wisconsin cases 
upholding the validity of any sports-related liability waivers.  In Cass v. Amer-
ican Home Assurance Co.,327 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals ruled that a re-
lease of liability stating the plaintiff does hereby release and forever discharge 
defendant from liability for negligence does not bar plaintiff’s claim for injuries 
caused by the negligent operation of a snowmobile by defendant’s employee.328  
                                                          
320 2005 WI 4, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 691 N.W.2d 334. 
321 Id. at ¶ 26. 
322 Id. at ¶ 27. 
323 Id. at ¶ 26. 
324 Id. at ¶ 36. 
325 Id. at ¶¶ 19, 23, 25. 
326 Id. at ¶ 47 (Wilcox, J., dissenting). 
327 2005 WI App 126, 284 Wis. 2d 572, 699 N.W.2d 254.  
328 Id. at ¶¶ 2, 3, 13. 
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The court ruled this language “is not sufficiently clear, unambiguous, or unmis-
takable to release [defendant] from the alleged negligence,”329 although it stated 
“CAUTION!  READ BEFORE SIGNING.  THIS DOCUMENT AFFECTS 
YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS AND WILL BAR YOUR RIGHT TO SUE.”330  Thus, 
sports-related personal injury liability waivers now may be de facto invalid per 
se. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 The Seventh Circuit and Wisconsin federal and state courts have made 
several important, and, in some cases, precedent-setting, contributions to Amer-
ican sports law jurisprudence.  Their respective judicial decisions have signifi-
cantly shaped the evolving legal framework that governs high school, college, 
Olympic, and professional sports, as well as the resolution of sports-related in-
tellectual property and tort issues.  Hopefully this identification, synthesis, and 
explanation of the sports law jurisprudence of the Seventh Circuit and Wiscon-
sin will facilitate its future development in a consistent and predictable manner 
that guides and influences the law governing sports in other jurisdictions.     
  
 
                                                          
329 Id. at ¶ 9. 
330 Id. at ¶ 2. 
